Traditional theorists concur that good legal system has been linked with well-defined property rights, reduction in transactions costs, increase in investments, and economic growth. Nevertheless, China experienced a strong economic growth in spite of a poor legal system. To explore the reasons behind, this research paper reviews the literature about the relationship between law and economic growth from global perspective. After that, this paper tries to locate the reasons on why the formal rules and regulations may not have strong correlation with China's growth. The research concludes that while many people label Guanxi as something negative, Guanxi is an informal system of legal rules from a Western perspective, or de facto, China's style of legal enforcement. Nevertheless, as the Chinese economy grows, transaction costs may become too high if we rely on guanxi and good legal system is needed to ensure a sustainable economic growth.
Introduction
In 1978, China implemented economic reform and an Open Door Policy (Mo, 2009; Su, 2009 ) and has since adopted a series of reform measures that aim to transform China from a centrally planned state to a socialist market economy (Siu & Liu, 2005; Su, 2009) . Consequently, the legal, social, cultural and political environment of China has become chaotic. While the central government decentralised decision-making power to enterprises and gave them greater rights to control, government planning still set the institutional determinants, and political and economic institutions influenced the firms' behaviour and performance. Hence, the performance of Chinese enterprises is determined not only by the environmental factors in the market economy but also by environmental and institutional influences (Siu & Liu, 2005) . While many scholars assert that rule of law and economic development are positively related (North, 1973; North, 1990; Cross, 2001; ), China appears be to an exception to this view. Resulted from free-market-oriented neoclassical economic policies and principles (Das, 2008) , China was the ninth fastest growing economy Over the past 25 years (Wu, 2011) . The size of its economy now ranks second in the world (twenty years ago, China was ranked 10 th ) (Table 1) (Bustelo, 2011) . Unfortunately, the Chinese legal system is underdeveloped and laws are loosely enforced. So, is it sufficient to say that the rise of China is a paradoxical mismatch with the traditional concept that there is positive correlation between economic growth and good legal system? This paper first reviews the scholar's view on the relationship between the rule of law and economic development worldwide and in China; this is followed by a discussion of traditional Chinese culture, focusing on Guanxi, an informal system of legal rules from a Western perspective or de facto, China's style of legal enforcement. This paper concludes that the western style rule of law may not be a major determining factor in a country's initial economic development in a relatively simple society where informal institutions such as guanxi are sufficient for playing the legal role. Nevertheless, formal written rule of law will certainly become more important as transaction costs grow and collectivism fades in China. 
A Scholar's View of the Relationship between Rule of Law and Economic Development: An International Perspective
After World War II, the revival of Western economies led to an increase in popularity for research in economics and law. In 1960, Ronald Coase asserted that the uncertainty of property rights would lead to high transaction costs and consequently hinder economic development (Coase, 1960) . North, in 1973 , proposed the Rights Hypothesis, claiming that the enforcement of contractual rights and security rights is necessary to economic development (North, 1973) , e.g. it determines both the rate and direction of investment (Carden & Hall, 2010) . When law is nonexistent or weak, the enforcement of property contract rights depends on threat and sometimes violence. The hidden costs of these substitutes include a bias against new firms, which have no reputation to demonstrate their reliability to their clients (Posner, 1998) . As mentioned by Martin (2012) , "when the rules of the game are not stable, competition hindered." The World Bank's researchers, in the 1997 World Bank Report, affirmed that countries with "predictable methods of changing law, secure property rights, and a strong judiciary saw higher investment and growth than countries lacking these institutions" (Peerenboom, 2002) . The empirical evidence supports Peerenboom's aforesaid proposition. Research focused on the relationship between rule of law and economic development performed by the World Bank and the US's CIA found that there is a proportional increase in rule of law and social wealth. found that the likelihood of a high rule of law country enjoying higher income is 29/34 (85.29%), a finding that coincides with other scholarly views (Bashir, 2002; Kumssa & Mbeche, 2004; Krever, 2011; Osman, Alexiou, & Tsaliki, 2011 ) (one exceptional case was (Osman et al., 2011) ). As concluded by The Economist (2008), the general view of scholarship is that "rule of law has become the motherhood and apple pie of development economics."
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Portugal Institutions affect economic growth as far as they affect transaction costs and the production possibility frontiers. While more than half of the ten institutional indices that have the strong impact on economic growth, legal area is the most promising area among all these institution factors. (Adbdoul, 2008) 123 countries An improvement in the individual quality of democratic property rights and regulatory institutions is favourable for sustainable economic growth.
Economic growth requires the presence of good institutions which gurantee relatively low costs for investments. (Badun, 2006) Croatia If the courts fail to enforce contract, fail to protect rights of property, and fail to resolve disputes in good time, the motivation for investment and innovation will be reduced, incentives for productive activities will be lowered, and rent-seeking activities will be enlarged. Similarly, failure to respect the rule of law brings a fall in respect for the justice system and the confidence in justice which in turn affect the level of investment. In Croatia, therefore, the rule of law is an important factor which affects the economic growth. (Cross, 2001 ) Not specific The neoclassical economic model concedes that levels of economic development should steadily converge among nations and ultimately equalizing wealth independent of law. The new institutional economics suggests that institutional capital may be a more important determinant of economic development than physical capital, financial capital, technological capital or human capital. (North, 1990 ) Not specific The existence of a legal system which protects property and contract rights is a precondition for economic development as the costs will be unacceptably high without such a system. The lack of certainty about who will receive benefit from investments and/or transactions will inhibit such transactions. Rule of law embodies and encourages a just society, also enhances economic growth. Therefore, a higher rule of law, the richer the nation. (Posner, 1998) Not specific When law is weak or nonexistent, enforcement of property rights depends on threat and violence. The hidden costs of these substitutes are bias against new firms with no reputation to show their clients their level of reliability.
Therefore, a small expenditure on law reform raises the economic growth rate. 
China as an Exception -The Informal Rules That Are Supplementary to the Formal Written Rule of Law Leads the Dragon to the Road of Revival
Between 1995 and 2008, China's average annual growth rate for GDP was 9.64%, which was over twice the world's average (4.56%). China was also the ninth-fastest growing economy among the 183 economies in a study conducted by Wu (2011) . Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to this fast growing economy is China's underdeveloped legal system, which is vulnerable to political pressure, the poor enforcement of legal rules and weak and poorly defined property rights (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; Braendle, Gasser, & Noll, 2005; Davison & Ou, 2008; Ji, 2009; Landry, Tong, & Shen, 2009; Lu & Yang, 2009; Yueh, 2010; Wu, 2011; . For example, corruption is one of China's major problems (China ranks 75 out of 182 countries for the level of corruption in 2011) (Braendle et al., 2005; Transparency International, 2011 ) along with violation of intellectual property rights (Chow, 1997) . Each year, 15 million illegal mobile phones are distributed worldwide from Shenzhen, and illegal mobile phones occupy 1/3 of the market: Chinese manufacturers change one or two letters of the branded product and turn it into their own product (Hu, 2008) . China has also been criticised for being the world's major culprit in intellectual property infringement; it accounts for nearly 2/3 of counterfeit goods, including motorcycles, movies, music CDs, DVDs, designer handbags and so on, with an estimated 512 million counterfeit products having been sold worldwide (Priest, 2006 ) . Therefore, many scholars note that a strong legal system is not a precondition for economic growth in China (Allen et al., 2005; Clarke, Murrell, & Whiting, 2006; Lu & Yang, 2009 ), or they predict that law will simply develop after economic growth (Chen, 2003; Shen & Wang, 2009) , despite the many scholars who believe that well-developed legal systems favour economic growth (Potter, 1999; Lam & Chen, 2004; Yu, 2009 ). The relationship between law and economic growth (Lam & Zonggui, 2004 ) A concrete, objective set of regulations assists long-term economic development by increasing the level of certainty. Greater certainty in law ultimately attracts more foreign investment and promotes economic growth. (Yu, 2009) Empirical data shows that there is a close relationship between the growth rate of fixed asset investment and GDP growth rate. As property rights is important in attracting private investment and the business organization law paves the way for level playing field between different enterprises, law is important in economic development. (Potter, 1999) Laws which govern the foreign business activities make direct investment possible; they also play an essential role in economic growth. (Wu, 2007) An effective legal regulatory framework allows a market to produce in its maximum efficiency. As the market development goes further, the bureaucratic system must strive to transform its regulation towards the rule of law and China is developing its legal system to improve the certainty and market economy development. (Jiang & Prater, 2002) Laws which govern the intellectual business operations become effective after China's acceptance to WTO. This lowers the operational and financial risks of the foreign firms, encourages their growth in China. The rule of law and economic development are closely related, and tend to mutually reinforcing.
The Formal Written Rule of Law Is NOT Promoted in the Traditional Chinese Culture
The traditional Chinese culture does not promote the usage of written laws, rules and regulations in dispute resolution. Black and white written rules, in the eyes of the masses and leaders, are tools used by the ruler to control the social order (Chen, 2003) . Because these laws have predominantly been linked with unpleasant historical memories, both in the public's view and in reality, the Chinese generally view them with fear and aversion (Braendle et al., 2005) . A Chinese proverb even says "Do not visit the bureau when one is alive; do not visit hell when one is dead." (Sheng-buru-guanmen, si-buru-diyu.) The Chinese equate seeking resolution from government (or, in the present sense, the court) to being put into hell after death. Conspicuously, formal rules and regulations are not the first option for people trying to solve conflicts or relationship issues. Additionally, the traditional legal system seldom provides individuals with instruments and guidelines for addressing private disputes.
In addition to the notorious traditional image of the law, Chinese culture also drives the general public away from the law. In sharp contrast to individualistic life in the Western world, China is a collectivist society with low degree of individualism (Jia & Kvan, 2005) . Collective culture values shape the expectations of individual's behaviour (Jia, Rowlinson, Kvan, & Yip, 2009) . One of the predominant features of collectivism is its de-emphasis of the rule of law (Collier, 2002) . Most likely, people believe that seeking the bureaucracy's involvement hampers relationships among parties, which contravenes the concept of hexie (peace and harmony).
Indeed, the rule and use of law to resolve conflicts and seek resolution is a Western concept, and the transplant of western rule of law to the Chinese culture is tedious and difficult (Chen, 2000) . Therefore, even today, courts are not the resource for concerns, as illustrated by business practice: among the approximately five million enterprises in China, only 4% have regular legal advisers (Allen et al., 2005) . So, is there any substitute or www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 9, No. 9; complement to the rule of law that facilitates the economic development of China?
Alternative Enforcement and Punishment System
The high enforcement cost under the American legal system suggests that informal alternatives to legal regulation may be more efficient than competitive markets based on law (Jones, 1994; Chow, 1997) . The solution to an ineffective legal system lies in a traditional culture with regard to its possible outcomes on society (Braendle et al., 2005) . Although the written form of rule of law is weak in China, Guanxi, an informal legal enforcement system, is de facto China's style of law in a simple collectivistic society.
Guanxi as an Alternative Reward and Punishment System: China-Style Rule of Law
Traditional Chinese culture rejects individualism. What people emphasise is Guanxi, or in some scholar's definition, "friendship with implications of continued exchange of favors" (Pye, 1992) . In Chinese society, guanxi is a type of human capital, and having guanxi is like having a reputation conveyed by a college degree and knowledge of which friend would be helpful when needed (Chow, 1997) . Guanxi identifies the importance of the collective in social interaction in China (Law & Jones, 2009 ). The Chinese believe that the person who is encountered for the first time cannot be trusted (Luo & Chen, 1996) ; the Chinese usually treat strangers with caution (Wang, Huang, Chu, & Wang, 2010) and continue to assess a stranger until he is proved to be trustworthy by daily experience (Luo & Chen, 1996) . In effect, who you know is more important then what you know (Wong, 2007) . Unlike the foreigners who do business before they dine together, the Chinese usually dine before doing business together (Zolkiewski & Feng, 2009 ). According to Victor Fund, the Chairman of Prudential Asia (1994), "if you are being considered for a new partnership, a personal reference from a respected member of the Chinese business community is worth more than any amount of money you could throw on the table" (Kraar, 1994) . In this sense, guanxi is an important asset for both individuals and firms. Nevertheless, guanxi can also be a major hurdle when doing business or when the best candidate in the job market is not selected because he lacks an interpersonal network. Therefore, many people believe that guanxi may be detrimental to society.
Yet, guanxi serves as enforcement. For example, if a company or an individual has always fulfilled its/his promise, it/he will be considered to be trustworthy and people will trade with it/him again (Luo & Chen, 1996) . Guanxi can also ruin trades: when someone fails to follow the rule of reciprocity and equity, he will be labelled as untrustworthy and no one will trade with him again (Luo & Chen, 1996) . More importantly, social guanxi is transferrable (Tsang, 1998) . A breach of faith against one person will be harmful to his business with others because the victim will depict him as evil to his friends and family. This negative influence could be far-reaching if the person who was betrayed has a broad guanxi network. Therefore, no one dares to go back on his word or to make money at another's expense. Any misbehaviour will hamper the guanxi network. In this sense, guanxi could be treated as an alternative reward and punishment system, a type of "unwritten law" (Braendle et al., 2005) that serves as a surrogate market system due to ill-defined property rights, economic roles, and a restricted flow of information (Braendle et al., 2005) ; guanxi has become the engine of growth for SMEs in China (Ji, 2009 ).
Other Alternatives
Aside from guanxi, the Chinese family concept also guarantees the fulfilment of promises. Family is the centre of life, and family awareness is more salient than individuality (Braendle et al., 2005) . People treasure family life and relationships. Generally, no one would run away to avoid fulfilling an agreement because they would feel immoral and guilty about leaving their family behind; the family could suffer a loss of face for a misbehaviour that harms a third party. Even if someone abandoned his family, the victim is not abandoned; the family members would try their very best to implement the agreement or, at least, to pay compensation. They would likely feel ashamed for their family member's dishonesty; his dishonesty is an insult not only to himself but also to them. Executing the agreement is the best way for the family to save face.
Western Style Rule of Law Is a Must in Modern China
Guanxi occupies an important position in governing behaviour in modern China. Nevertheless, as the economy becomes increasingly complex due to marketisation, legal reform is playing a greater role in the decentralised market (Yueh, 2010) . The insufficiency of informal enforcement is also clearly depicted in the worsening of the environment. The increasingly frequent appearance of serious risk foods such as dyed bread buns, fake infant milk powder formula and poisoned pork over the past 10 years (Clarke, 2003; Balzano, 2012) demonstrate that guanxi is insufficient to monitor all aspects of people's behaviour (Clarke, 2003) . Conspicuously, the adoption of the rule of law is the ultimate solution to the problems arising from an increasingly complex society.
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Collectivism -Which Offers Housing-Keeping Rules -Is Fading
Traditional Chinese culture is being challenged by the "cultural invasion" of the West. Under the Open Door Policy, communications between China and the rest of the world have become more frequent. Western ideologies have been spread over China via various channels, e.g., education, media, etc. "Bourgeois individualism" and the "ethic of self-gain" has begun to influence the Chinese, especially the young generations (Yang, 1994) .
Traditional guiding principles such as guanxi and the family concept are fading. More importantly, under the "One Child Policy", each couple can raise only one child. The children born under this policy have become the "little emperor" of their family. This generation is relatively self-centred and individualistic. Not surprisingly, the mechanisms guiding relationships are, and continue to be, less influential. Formal written legal rule is the best tool to fill the gap left by the fading of collectivism.
Guanxi Cannot Address the Needs of an Increasingly Complex Society
The effectiveness of traditional values such as guanxi for regulating human behaviours largely varies with the degree of mobility of the citizens. If the entire family can move from one place to another easily, no one cares about the undesirable consequences of a breach of faith. Somebody can turn over a new leaf in a place far away from his hometown, and no victims will know where he is and his new neighbours will not know his history. The consequences resulting from prior misconduct can hardly affect him. Therefore, the effectiveness of traditional values relies on a basic requirement: the low mobility of the citizens.
China has experienced rapid development since 1995. The mobility of citizens is unprecedentedly high; for example, the hukou (household registration) system no longer accurately reflects the population distribution. The increasing flexibility of the hukou system has led to an extraordinary increase in the intra-and inter-provincial migration. The fifth national census (2000) counted 121.07 million long-term nationwide migrants. Millions of people who registered in rural areas have already moved to urban areas (Landry et al., 2009) . A study conducted in 2002 showed that these urban "movers" amounted to 20% of a sample taken in Beijing (Landry & Shen, 2005) . Moreover, with the speedy construction of infrastructure, e.g., the length of railways and the length of highways increased by 19.9% and 233.6%, respectively, from 1995 to 2009 (Table 5 ) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). It is reasonable to predict that the mobility of citizens will further increase in the future. In other words, the efficacy of traditional values as an informal ruling system is diminishing. Furthermore, the transaction costs of guanxi in a simple village (for example, a village with 10 people) are quite low. Nevertheless, the costs become high when the business expands to a large city where building up relationships with the many people becomes an impossible task. The popularity of the internet further complicates the picture: buyers may come from Guangzhou while the sellers are in Ha'erbin. This type of trading is beyond the range of guanxi. Secondly, companies in the Western World expand their business to China, so as the China ones expand their business to Africa and the West (Tuuli & Rowlison, 2009) where guanxi network fails to cover these activities. Furthermore, the high transaction costs to overcome the existing problem in legal system with the help from guanxi network may become another hurdle, apart from input driven suggested by Troilo and Sun (2010) , that restrain economic growth in the future. More importantly, traditional values have fundamental drawbacks: those who are not in the guanxi network or are not family members may face difficulties in maintaining and expanding their business. In a recent interview conducted jointly by the Hurun Report and the Bank of China, 25% of the billionaires claimed that the reason for investing overseas was that they were afraid that the government officials with whom they do not have good guanxi may prosecute them by using loopholes in the legal system (Mingpao, 2011) . Apparently, constructing a fair legal system is a must to restore the confidence of local and foreign investors.
In addition, guanxi may be utilised by unscrupulous people to operate a business at the expense of the country's and the public's long-term interest. For instance, factory owners could evade punishment when discharging sewage that does not meet the governmental standard by asking for help from officials with whom they have good guanxi. By some estimates, China needs 2% -5% GDP annually to clean up the environment (North, 1973) . Obviously, relying only upon traditional values such as guanxi cannot ensure sustainable economic development. Instead, the rule of law may be a better tool for this purpose.
Conclusion
Traditional values explain why China is an exception to the principle that economic development must be the result of a good legal system. Nonetheless, due to the increasing complexity of China's society and business world and due to the fundamental defects of traditional values as an informal ruling system, perfecting the legal system is the only way to guarantee sustainable economic development for China.
